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3I
T IS A PRIVILEGE AND A GREAT PLEASURE to contribute to the
10th Anniversary issue of Human Rights Brief. I have read with
interest every issue since its inception. It has displayed a uniform-
ly high standard of articles and has kept me informed on topics
relevant to my work and in areas of general interest. I congratulate the
student editors at American University’s Washington College of Law
on the excellence of this publication.
POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECOND
HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY
THE SECOND HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY was remarkable for the
development of international human rights law and the recognition
of, and growing respect for, international criminal justice. It is fre-
quently forgotten that prior to World War II, individuals had no
standing at all in international law and, apart from insignificant excep-
tions, humanitarian law had never been enforced.
There were dramatic changes as a consequence of the
Nuremberg Trials of major Nazi war criminals and the ratification of
the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the inter-
national human rights conventions of the 1960s. Perhaps most
importantly, these developments began to gradually penetrate the
strict theories and applications of national sovereignty. 
The United Nations Charter contains an irresoluble contradic-
tion—the protection of human rights on the one hand, and the pro-
hibition of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign nations on
the other. With the passing of each decade of the post-World War II
world, governments, international entities, and non-governmental
organizations felt increasingly justified and free to criticize the manner
in which some governments violated the human rights of their own
citizens. The anti-Apartheid movement led the way in this develop-
ment. In face of intransigence from South Africa’s Apartheid govern-
ment, the United Nations, regional organizations, and individual
countries imposed multi-faceted sanctions upon South Africa. The
United States, notwithstanding its uncompromising protection of its
own sovereignty, began to issue annual human rights reports reflecting
the human rights record of almost every member state of the United
Nations. 
Notwithstanding these exciting developments, there were two
glaring shortcomings. The first relates to the direct lack of respect for
norms of humanitarian law in the manner in which states conducted
warfare. Civilians continued to be the intended targets of internation-
al and internal armed conflicts. The second shortcoming was the
absence of any international criminal court and, as a consequence, the
effective impunity enjoyed by war criminals.
It took ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia to address these
omissions. In the face of horrendous human rights violations in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United Nations Security Council, to the
surprise of international lawyers, established the ad hoc International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in May 1993. It did so on
the strength of its peacekeeping powers under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter. After the Rwanda genocide that was perpe-
trated in the middle of 1994, the Security Council established the ad
hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
After surviving difficult birth pangs, the advent of the two
United Nations tribunals had a number of remarkable consequences.
First, they demonstrated that international courts could work and pro-
vide fair trials. Second, they were responsible for substantial advances
in humanitarian law, particularly in the areas of gender-related war
crimes and in narrowing the artificial and unjustifiable distinction
between the protections afforded to protected persons in internation-
al armed conflict and those in internal armed conflict. Third, they
have been responsible for the increase of interest in humanitarian law.
Prior to 1993, humanitarian law was taught only in some army col-
leges and was only rarely referred to in the popular media. Today, the
subject is taught in thousands of law schools around the world and
hardly a day goes by without reference to humanitarian law in the
media of many countries. 
Finally, the work of the United Nations criminal tribunals has
led to the greater protection of innocent civilians in war. During and
after World War II, civilian populations became the intended targets
of warfare. One needs to refer only to the blitzes of London and
Coventry, the fire bombing of Dresden, and the atomic bombs
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the civil wars that proliferat-
ed during the second half of the last century, some 90 percent of those
killed were civilians. It was not an issue and there was no attempt to
disguise the criminal intent behind those policies.
These positive developments were primarily attributable to the
leadership role played by the government of the United States. The
United Nations tribunals would not have survived their first few
years without the political and financial support from Washington,
and, above all, the United States lawyers, investigators, and comput-
er technicians who were sent to assist setting up the new Office of
the Prosecutor for the respective tribunals.
It was the success of the two United Nations criminal tribunals
and the support of the United States that were primarily responsible
for the Secretary-General of the United Nations calling the diplomat-
ic conference that met in Rome in June and July of 1998 to consider
a statute for the International Criminal Court. 
The Clinton administration, which did so much for the United
Nations tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, underwent
a change of heart and emerged in Rome as an opponent of the
International Criminal Court. It became part of an unusual alliance
with only six other nations opposing the Rome Treaty—China, Iraq,
Israel, Libya, Qatar, and Yemen. However, there was a critical mass of
120 nations that voted in favor of the treaty, and the sixty necessary
ratifications took less than four years to materialize. Notwithstanding
the administration’s opposition in Rome, President Clinton signed the
Rome Treaty on December 31, 2001. As of this writing, 92 nations
have ratified the treaty. The court’s eighteen judges and its chief pros-
ecutor have all been elected. Investigations into war crimes committed
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been announced and
will begin in the near future. The United States has also supported the
United Nations’ involvement in setting up hybrid criminal tribunals
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in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia.
All of these developments have resulted in a changed and bet-
ter world in which humanitarian law is no longer ignored. Some evil
leaders in the former Yugoslavia pretended to adopt policies
designed to protect civilians. Even that lip service to the norms of
humanitarian law served to protect some lives. The leaders of the
democracies took these legal precepts seriously. In the 78 days of
bombing by NATO forces designed to protect the Albanian popula-
tion of Kosovo from ethnic cleansing, the number of civilian casual-
ties was remarkably small—less than 2000. This was the conse-
quence of military lawyers being on hand to advise the NATO com-
manders on appropriate and justifiable military targets. During the
United States war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, the policy
there too was to avoid civilian casualties. Although the number of
casualties has not been stated, that policy was a dramatic change
from the pre-1993 practice. That policy was also utilized during the
2003 “coalition” war on Iraq.
THE CHANGE OF ATTITUDE IN WASHINGTON
The support of the United States for a permanent international
criminal court all but evaporated in the face of the fears and objections
that emerged during 1998 from the Pentagon. The American military
leaders were not prepared to support an international court that would
have the power to render judgments against American citizens and, in
particular, its military or political leaders. It feared that such a tribu-
nal might turn out to have an anti-American bias with negative con-
sequences for what is perceived in Washington as the United States’
obligation to police much of the world.
The isolationist policies of the Bush Administration and its seri-
ous disregard for the civil liberties of people subject to its control have
cast a shadow on the advances to which I have referred. The Clinton
Administration’s policy of non-cooperation with the then nascent
International Criminal Court has been replaced with an active policy
to prevent the court from succeeding in its mission. The so-called
article 98 agreements pedaled around the world by the Bush
Administration can have no other design. To pressure countries like
Micronesia to agree not to hand American citizens to the
International Criminal Court is quite ludicrous and can have no
other rational purpose other than undercutting the authority and
jurisdiction of that court.
The opposition of the United States to the International
Criminal Court may well retard its progress. I have already referred to
the crucial support of the Clinton Administration during the early
years of the United Nations criminal tribunals. This support went
much further. Without the political and financial pressure that
Washington exerted on the governments of Croatia and Serbia, the
majority of the war criminals indicted by the Yugoslavia tribunal
would not have faced trials in The Hague to answer the charges made
against them. Certainly, without the threat of withdrawing financial
aid, Slobodan Milosovic would not now be on trial. The extent to
which the International Criminal Court will succeed in the absence of
that support, and worse, in the face of active opposition from the
United States, remains to be seen. 
THE EFFECTS IN THE UNITED STATES OF 9/11
I turn now to consider the effect of attacks on the United States
by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 (9/11). The first point to note is
that this was not a new phenomenon. All that was new was that a seri-
ous and cold-blooded terrorist attack took place on the mainland of
the United States. That there had been previous bloody terrorist
attacks on American targets in Africa and the Middle East was treated
differently. The reaction of the Bush Administration was a conse-
quence of anger and, above all, fear of more such attacks. 
For more than two decades, terrorist organizations have used
modern technology and even threatened the use of weapons of mass
destruction. This phenomenon has made it necessary for policing
authorities to be given additional powers to detect and prevent such
criminal acts and to protect the civilian populations for whom they are
responsible. Since the early 1970s, the United Nations General
Assembly has adopted a series of international conventions designed to
deter acts of terrorism. 
Many democratic nations are engaged in a difficult debate on
how best to balance this need for greater policing powers with the pro-
tection of the fundamental civil liberties of their citizens. When there
is fear in democracies, governments tend to demand and are granted
far more powers, even at the cost of substantial invasions of the priva-
cy of their citizens or taking excessive actions to the prejudice of
minority groups.
For many years, the United States has justly regarded itself as the
leader of the free world and has regarded its constitution as the guar-
antor of the freedom of its own people from excessive interference by
the government. Yet, in the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush
Administration has assumed powers that traditionally have been in the
domain of the legislature and the judiciary. In this regard, history is
repeating itself. 
After the Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor in December 1941,
126,000 Japanese Americans were interned. Of those, 70,000 were
American-born citizens. No single act of sabotage or espionage was
ever uncovered. Nearly three years later, in December 1944, in
Korematsu v. United States, the United States Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the mass evacuations. The issue was whether
there had been military necessity to justify such extreme action. The
majority of the Court held that “[w]e cannot—by availing ourselves
of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that these actions
were not justified.” Today, few Americans support this decision.
Indeed, in 1984 a federal district court overturned the decision in
Korematsu on the ground that the government had “knowingly with-
held information from the courts when they were considering the
critical question of military necessity.” And, in 1988, President
Ronald Reagan apologized to the Japanese community on behalf of
the American people for what had befallen them, and Congress
voted for them to be paid reparations.
In reaction to the events of 9/11, there has been a similar reac-
tion on the part of some American judges to second-guess the execu-
tive branch or to interfere with the war powers of the president. It is
reassuring that the Supreme Court has decided that it will decide the
issue of whether federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the reach
of the courts to protect the rights of those being detained as enemy
combatants on Guantanamo Bay. As recently pointed out by one of
the senior English judges, Lord Steyn:
The purpose of holding the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay
was and is to put them beyond the rule of law, beyond the
protection of any courts, and at the mercy of the victors.
The procedural rules do not prohibit the use of force to
coerce prisoners to confess. On the contrary, the rules
expressly provide that statements made by a prisoner
under physical or mental duress are admissible “if the evi-
dence would have value to a reasonable person,” i.e., mil-
itary officers trying enemy soldiers (Presidential Military
Order of 13 November 2001, s. 4(3)). At present we are
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5not meant to know what is happening at Guantanamo
Bay. But history will not be neutered. What takes place
there today in the name of the United States will assured-
ly, in due course, be judged at the bar of informed inter-
national opinion.
It is also disturbing that the manner in which persons detained
on the battlefield are being held on Guantanamo Bay is also in viola-
tion of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949. This convention, to
which the United States is a party, provides that such persons are
deemed to be prisoners of war. If that status is questioned by the
detaining power, the presumption continues to operate until a “com-
petent tribunal” has determined their status. No such determination
has been made in respect of anyone being held at Guantanamo Bay,
and all have been denied the status of prisoner of war. I am concerned
that this weakening of the Geneva Conventions might have a
boomerang effect and that it might well be used to justify violations of
its provisions in respect to the captured members of the U.S. armed
forces abroad.
The United States Supreme Court has now also decided to con-
sider the constitutionality of detaining United States citizens without
trial and without access to lawyers. In the recent past, such conduct by
other governments around the world has earned the strong criticism
of the United States. Again, it is reassuring that federal courts of
appeal have ruled against the extreme position taken by the White
House. It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will uphold those tra-
ditions and values for which the United States Constitution has
become a beacon for those millions of people whose human rights are
being violated in repressive societies.
THE EFFECTS OF 9/11 IN OTHER DEMOCRACIES
Repressive action by governments have been taken in other
democracies in the wake of 9/11. Prior to September 11, 2001, the
United Kingdom had enacted wide-ranging measures to counter ter-
rorism. It did so predominantly in the face of the Irish Republican
Army terrorist activities in and about London. After the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, a new anti-terrorism statute was enacted. Its most controver-
sial provision provides for the internment, without trial, of a “suspect-
ed international terrorist” if the Home Secretary reasonably believes
that such person’s presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to nation-
al security and suspects that such person is a terrorist. If the person is
not a United Kingdom citizen, he or she can be detained for an
unspecified period without charge or trial. There is no appeal to the
ordinary courts but only to a government-appointed commission. It
was this provision that led the United Kingdom government to dero-
gate from the relevant human rights provisions of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
Similarly, recent Indian legislation substantially invades the pri-
vacy of persons in material respects and allows for the detention of sus-
pected terrorists without trial for periods of up to 90 days. A draft
South African legislation contained a similar provision. But the
Parliamentary Justice Committee removed it after protests based on
the misuse of that kind of provision during the Apartheid era. 
Racial profiling and the detention of illegal immigrants from
Muslim countries have become frequently applied mechanisms to
combat terrorism. It was the unanimous opinion of the Task Force on
Terrorism established by the International Bar Association that racial
profiling is not justified unless there is a factual basis that makes it
effective and proportionate to the perceived dangers. 
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
THIS DISPROPORTIONATE INVASION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES, especially
by the United States, is having a most unfortunate domino effect in
other nations, democratic and undemocratic alike. It is being used to
justify far worse repressive actions. President Mugabe of Zimbabwe
and Charles Taylor, the former head of state of Sierra Leone, both
relied on the United States’ classification of “unlawful combatants” to
commit unjustifiable actions against journalists critical of them.
Leaders in Indonesia have threatened to establish their own
“Guantanamo Bay.”
The United Nations Security Council has also been tardy in
making any effort to ensure that civil liberties are being respected in
legislation that member states were peremptorily required by
Resolution 1373 to enact. The attitude of the Counter Terrorism
Committee of the Council is apparently that human rights are not the
business of the Security Council.
A recent United States inquiry commission has recommended
the establishment of a non-partisan committee to monitor the inva-
sion of civil liberties by the executive branch of state governments. I
would suggest that all democratic nations should take such action and
report regularly to their legislatures. In particular, they should report
on violations of their own constitutional guarantees and of the provi-
sions of international conventions to which they are party. That kind
of public oversight would unquestionably act as an effective brake on
excessive and unjustified encroachments upon civil liberties.
The late High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sergio Vieira
de Mello, who was tragically killed in Baghdad in August 2003, put
the issue as follows:
[Such] measures must be taken in transparency, they
must be of short duration, and must respect the funda-
mental, non-derogable rights embodied in our human
rights norms. They must take place within the frame-
work of the law. Without that, the terrorists will ulti-
mately win and we will ultimately lose—as we would
have allowed them to destroy the very foundation of our
modern human civilization.
All who value the protection of human rights and the dignity of
all people must remain vigilant in these difficult and worrisome times.
They should help those in authority hold a balance between the neces-
sity of protecting the lives of citizens on the one hand, and protecting
their fundamental civil liberties on the other. They must ensure that
governments and their officials do not rely on repressive measures for
no reason other than to placate the fears of the populace and to ensure
that opinion polls are favorable. 
Whether these post-9/11 developments will permanently damage
the advances referred to earlier or whether it will turn out to be only an
unfortunate detour, it is too early to determine. Whatever their effect,
I have no doubt that the movement towards an international rule of
law will depend primarily upon the leadership of the United States. It
is my fervent hope that America will soon resume its leadership of the
free and democratic world and will do so by the exercise not of its great
power but by the example of its equally great values.  HRB
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